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Abstract
Financial integration among economies has the benefit of improving allocative efficiency 
and diversifying risk. However the recent global financial crisis, considered as the worst 
since the Great Depression has re-ignited the fierce debate about the merits of financial 
globalization  and its  implications  for  growth especially  in  developing countries.  This 
paper  examines  whether  equity  markets  in  emerging  countries  were  vulnerable  to 
contagion during the recent financial meltdown. Findings show: (1) with the exception of 
India, Asian markets were worst hit; (2) but for Peru, Venezuela and Columbia, Latin 
American countries were least affected; (3) Africa and Middle East emerging markets 
were averagely contaminated with the exception of Kenya, Morocco, Dubai, Jordan and 
Lebanon.  As  a  policy  implication,  India’s  step-wise  financial  liberalization  approach 
should be emulated. Lessons from Latin American fiscal and monetary policies should be 
learned and/or revised. 
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1. Motivation
During  the  last  decade  the  concern  about  regional  and  global  integration  of 
emerging equity markets has been largely debated. The recent global financial meltdown 
and  economic  downturn  has  left  many  analysts  concerned  about  whether  emerging 
markets suffered from contagion. Most of these markets were still at their infancy at the 
turn of the millennium, which rendered an examination of the transmission of financial 
variable  movements  from  global  crisis  somewhat  impractical.  Therefore,  regrettably 
effects of the US stock market crash of 1987, the Mexican peso crisis of 1994, Asian 
currency crisis of 1997, Russian and LTCM1 crises of 1998, Brazilian crisis of 1999 and 
Turkish 2000/2001 crisis have not been fully comparatively appreciated in all emerging 
equity  markets.  The  recent  financial  crisis  provides  a  golden  opportunity  for  this 
investigation. 
There are plenty of reasons a paper should be dedicated to studying the extent to 
which emerging financial markets were affected by the recent global financial turmoil. 
Results  of  the  study could enable  analysts  and policy makers  to  evaluate  benefits  of 
international trade and cross-border investments, and therefore attractiveness for foreign 
capital  inflows. Findings could also provide some basis on how developing countries 
stand to benefit (lose) from long-run investment sources and global financial booms (as a 
result  of  external  financial  shocks)  through  financial  market  integration.  A  natural 
extension of results could invite policy makers to reconsider Latin American monetary 
and fiscal strategies in the fight against external financial shocks. Also, some justification 
or invalidation of India’s financial liberalization strategy could be of crucial importance 
1 Long-term Capital Management. 
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to governments in other developing countries.2 Therefore this study in overall terms aims 
to elucidate how vulnerable emerging financial markets are to global financial shocks and 
possible suggestions on policies that could attenuate such risk in the future. Our paper is 
organized as follows: section 2 thoroughly reviews related literature; we present our data 
and outline the methodology for measuring contagion in section 3; empirical analysis is 
covered in section 4; we discuss results in section 5 before concluding. 
2. Related literature
2.1 Literature on effects of financial market integration
Financial integration between economies is believed to have two main positive 
impacts:  the  improvement  of  capital  allocative  efficiency and diversification  of  risks 
(Demyanyk and Volosovych, 2008; Coulibaly,  2009; Kose et al., 2011). However, the 
recent global financial  crisis which is viewed by many analysts  and policy makers as 
worst  since the Great  Depression has cast  a dark shadow on the contagious effect of 
financial integration; despite its advantages. There is an extensive economics and finance 
literature that addresses the potential benefits of financial integration. 
Borrowing  from  Kose  et  al.  (2011),  in  theory  financial  globalization  should 
facilitate  efficient  international  allocation  of  capital  and  improve  international  risks 
sharing. They posit that the benefits are much greater for developing countries because 
2Whereas the Indian current account has been opened fully though gradually in the 90s, a more calibrated approach has been followed 
to the opening of the capital account and subsequently the financial sector. This approach is consistent with the weight of available  
empirical evidence on the benefits of capital account liberalization for acceleration of economic growth, particularly in emerging 
economies. Evidence suggests that the greatest gains are obtained from openness to foreign direct investment followed by portfolio 
investment.  Benefits resulting from external debt flows are questionable until  greater domestic financial market development  has  
taken place (Henry, 2007)
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they are relatively scare in capital and rich in labor sources. In effect, access to foreign 
capital should help them grow faster through new sources of investment. They further 
profess that since developing countries have more volatile output growth than advanced 
industrial  economies;  their  potential  welfare  gains  from international  risk sharing  are 
much greater. Their findings reveal that, with certain identifiable thresholds in variables 
such as financial depth and institutional quality, the cost-benefit trade-off from financial 
openness  improves  significantly  once  the  threshold  conditions  are  met.  Much earlier 
Demyanyk  and  Volosovych(2008)  in  analyzing  the  benefits  of  financial  integration 
resulting  from  international  risk  sharing  among  25  European  Union(EU)  countries, 
presented a case for diversification of risk across EU member states if the risks are fully 
shared.  In a nutshell  they point to the fact that,  the 10 new members joining the EU 
should  have  higher  gains  than  the  long  standing  15  members.  The  most  striking 
indication of benefits of financial integration is the case of South Africa, a country that 
has  experienced  financial  autarky  as  a  result  of  the  embargo  imposed  in  1985  and 
removed in 1993. With respect to Coulibaly (2009), there was a significant decrease in 
the rates of investment, capital and output during the embargo period in South Africa, as 
compared to pre-embargo and post-embargo periods.   
  During the embargo South Africa could benefit from financial isolation in event 
of a global financial meltdown. This implies countries in relative financial autarky as less 
exposed  to  international  financial  shocks.  Though  a  prime  advantage  of  financial 
integration  is  risk  diversification,  paradoxically  increased  financial  globalization  can 
reduce  the  scope for  risk  diversification  because  integrated  markets  tend to  be  more 
interdependent and highly correlated. Another disadvantage of financial integration could 
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be linked to  threshold  factors  pointed  out  earlier  by Kose  et  al.  (2011).  Their  study 
reveals that countries with low levels of financial depth and institutional quality do not 
stand  to  benefit  from financial  integration.  This  perspective  is  shared  by  Schmukler 
(2004)  who  stresses  the  importance  of  sound  financial  fundamentals  and  strong 
macroeconomic  institutions,  the  presence  of  which  should  enable  more  effective 
management  of  crises  and  lower  the  probability  of  crises  and  contagion.  Therefore 
financial globalization could itself be a source of crises. 
2.2 Literature on link between financial integration (globalization) and crises
We have seen that financial globalization has several potential benefits. However 
the recent  stream of financial  crisis  and contagion owing to growing liberalization of 
financial systems and integration of financial markets around the world, might lead some 
to  suggest  that  globalization  breeds  financial  volatility  and  crises.  Though  domestic 
factors are mostly at the origin of crises, there are different channels via which financial 
globalization could be related to crises.
Firstly as pointed out by Schmukler (2004), when a country’s financial system is 
liberalized;  it  becomes  an  object  of  market  discipline  exercised  by both  foreign  and 
domestic investors. In a closed economy, only domestic investors monitor and react to 
unsound fundamentals; whereas in an open one, domestic and foreign investors might 
prompt the country to achieve sound fundamentals. As elucidated earlier, the absence of 
sound  macroeconomic,  financial  and  institutional  fundamentals  could  increase  the 
probability of crises. It logically follows that antagonistic interests and views between 
investors (domestic and foreign) on key fundamentals might precipitate crises and reduce 
the ability to effectively monitor and manage them.  
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Secondly,  even  with  sound  domestic  fundamentals  and  quality  institutions, 
international  financial  market  imperfections  could  also  lead  to  crises.  Among  other 
things,  these  could  lead  to  herding  behavior,  irrational  behavior,  speculative  attacks, 
bubbles,  and  crashes.  To  put  this  point  plainer,  regardless  of  market  fundamentals 
investors  could speculate  against  a  currency if  they believe  that  the exchange rate  is 
unsustainable;  this  could  lead  to  self-fulfilling  balance-of-payments.  This  thesis 
illustrated by Obstfeld (1986) has been purported by Schmukler (2004); amongst others. 
Thirdly, even in the presence of sound fundamentals and absence of imperfections 
in  international  capital  markets,  crises  might  still  arise  owing  to  external  factors 
(Schmukler ,2004) such as determinants of capital flows(Calvo et al.,1996) and foreign 
interest rates(Frankel and Rose ,1996). For instance if a country becomes dependent on 
foreign capital, shifts in foreign capital flows could create financial issues and economic 
downturns. Frankel and Rose (1996) clearly point-out the role foreign interest rates play 
in determining the likelihood of financial crises in developing countries.    
Fourthly,  still  borrowing from Schmukler  (2004),  financial  globalization could 
lead to financial crises by contagion, namely by shocks through real links, financial links 
and herding-behavior  or  unexplained high correlations.  We shall  focus on this  fourth 
example3 within our research  framework;  the elucidation  and definition  of  which are 
worthwhile.  
2.3 Literature on definitions and channels of contagion
2.3.1 Definitions of contagion
As yet, there is no established definition of contagion by economists. According 
to the World Bank, there are three main definitions of contagion. Firstly, from a broad 
3 Example on the link between financial integration and crises. 
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perspective  the  phenomenon  could  be  identified  with  the  general  process  of  stock 
transmission  across  countries.  Therefore,  it  is  worthwhile  understanding  that  this 
definition does encompass both negative shocks and positive spillover effects.  Secondly, 
contagion could be conceived as the propagation of shocks between two countries in 
excess  of  what  should  be  expected,  based on the  fundamentals  after  considering  co-
movements triggered by common shocks. This second definition is somewhat restrictive 
only  to  shocks  and  presupposes  the  mastery  of  what  constitutes  the  underlying 
fundamentals; without which an appraisal of excess co-movements is not possible. The 
last  and  more  restrictive  definition  considers  the  phenomenon  as  the  change  in  the 
transmission  mechanisms  that  take  place  during  a  period  of  turmoil  and  could  be 
appreciated  from  a  significant  increase  in  cross  market  correlations.  Within  the 
framework of this study, we shall be restricted to the third definition because: (1) our 
study aims to investigate the global financial crisis which is a negative shock and not a 
positive spill over (as opposed to the first definition);  and (2) we do not master what 
constitutes  underlying  fundamentals  of  co-movements  we  are  about  to  study  (in 
antagonism to the second definition). 
Empirically,  the  third  definition  was  first  proposed  by  Forbes  and  Rigobon 
(2002). They looked at contagion as a significant increase in market co-movements after 
a  shock  occurred  in  one  country.  With  respect  to  this  definition,  the  condition  for 
contagion is a significant increase in co-movements as a result of a shock in one market.  
This implies, if two markets display a high degree of co-movements during the stability 
period, even if they are highly correlated during a crisis; if this crisis-correlation is not 
significant, it does not amount to contagion. In the absence of a significant correlation 
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during  the  crisis  period,  the  term “interdependence”  is  used  to  qualify  the  situation 
between the two markets.  
2.3.2 Channels of contagion
Borrowing from Schmukler (2004), three mains channels of contagion have been 
indentified in literature :(1) real links which are often associated with trade links. For 
example if two countries are trading together and compete in the same external market, a 
devaluation  of  the  exchange  rate  of  one  country  deteriorates  the  other  country’s 
competitive  advantage.  In  a  bid to  rebalance  its  external  sectors,  the  loosing country 
would  want  to  devaluate  its  own  currency;  such  is  the  nature  of  Chino-American 
commercial  relations  today;  (2)  financial  links  come  in  when  two  economies  are 
connected through the international financial system. For instance, let’s consider leverage 
institutions facing margin calls. Should the value of the collateral fall as a result of a 
negative shock in one country, in a bid to increase their initial stock, these institutions 
will sell some of their holdings in countries not yet affected by the shock. This gives birth 
to a mechanism that ripples the shocks to other countries;  (3) finally,  due to herding 
behaviors  or  panics  resulting  from  asymmetric  information,  financial  markets  might 
transmit shocks across markets. We shall not elaborate on the mechanics of this third type 
because of obvious reasons (common sense).  
2.4 Literature on measure of contagion 
Many methods of measuring contagion have been proposed in the literature to 
appreciate the spreading of international shocks across countries. The most widely used 
are cross-market correlations coefficients procedures (King and Wadhwani, 1990; Forbes 
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and  Rigobon,  2002;  Collins  and  Biekpe,  2003;  Lee  et  al.2007),  cross-market  co-
integration  vectors  changing  techniques  (Kanas,  1998),  volatility  analysis  based  on 
ARCH  and  GARCH  models  (King  et  al.,  1994)  and  direct  estimation  of  specific 
transmission  mechanisms (Forbes,  2000).  With  respect  to  our restrictive  definition  of 
contagion and we shall adopt Forbes and Rigobon (2002) in the context of Collins and 
Biekpe (2003)4. 
3. Data and Methodology
3.1 Data
The object of this study is to investigate correlations between the returns of the 
USA daily stock index and stock indexes of emerging countries. Taking the Dow Jones 
Industrial  Average  as  the  base  criterion,  we  analyze  if  co-movements  between  base 
criterion and afore mentioned financial markets were significantly strengthened during 
the  recent  global  financial  crisis.  In  et  al.  (2008),  MacAndrews  (2008),  Taylor  and 
William (2008) and more recently Ji and In (2010) all use the date August 9 2007 as the 
start of the financial  crisis5.   The sample period is divided into two categories:  a 14 
month pre-crisis period also known as the tranquil or stable period, and a 15 month crisis 
or turmoil  period.  In a bid to make our findings robust,  the turmoil  period is  further 
divided into three sections6: the short-run or four month crisis period (August 09, 2007 to 
December 06, 2007); the medium-term or eight months crisis period (August 09, 2007 to 
4 The  hypothesis  testing  in  Collins  and  Biekpe(2003)  is  slightly  different  from  that  of  Forbes  and 
Rigobon(2002) in that, the test statistics to determine contagion is not calculated using estimated sample  
variances.   Their test statistics (Collins and Biekpe; 2003) uses exact student statistics based on actual 
sample correlation coefficients.  Contagion is then measured by the significance of increase in adjusted 
correlation coefficients during the crisis period as compare with the stable period. 
5 Date at which, BNP Paribas announced the closure of its funds that held US subprime debts. 
6 From empirical literature, the tranquil period is always longer than the turmoil period. For instance it is 
longer by a year,  ten and a half months and  nine months in Forbes and Rigobon(2002), Collins and 
Biekpe(2003)  and Lee et al.(2007) respectively. 
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April  10,  2008)  and  the  long-term or  15  months  crisis  period  (August  09,  2007  to 
November  13,  2008).  Weekly  data  used  in  the  study  is  obtained  from Bloomberg’s 
database. We use local currency index return because Forbes and Rigobon (2002) have 
shown that using dollar or local indices will produce similar outcomes.      
3.2 Methodology 
Contagion is defined by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) as a significant increase in 
market co-movements after a shock occurred in one country7. 
The correlation coefficient is defined as:  
yx
xy
σσ
σ
ρ =                                                                                                   (1)
Where: ‘x’ is the base criterion while ‘y’ is an emerging equity market. 
Borrowing from Forbes and Rigobon (2002), the correlation coefficient is adjusted in the 
following manner:
])(1[1
*
2ρδ
ρρ
−+
=                                                                                  (2)
Where:
1−= l
xx
h
xx
σ
σδ
  which appreciates the change in high period volatility against low period volatility. The 
crisis  period  is  used  as  the  high  volatility  period  and the  tranquil  period  as  the  low 
volatility period in the calculation of this adjuster of correlation coefficient. Contagion is 
7 With respect to this definition, the presence of high correlation between two markets during the stable  
period and eventually continuous increase in the high degree of cross market co-movements at the turmoil  
period does not amount to contagion. Therefore contagion according to this definition is the presence of 
significant increase in co-movements after a shock. On the other hand, if the high correlation degree is not 
significant, the term “interdependence” is used to describe the event.
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subsequently measured as the significance of adjusted correlation coefficients in time- 
varying turmoil periods versus the stability period. 
In  empirical  literature,  Collins  and Biekpe (2003) and Lee  et  al.  (2007) have 
applied  both  the  t-test  and  F-test  respectively  for  the  significance  of  difference  in 
correlations.  When only  one  coefficient  is  to  be estimated,  both tests  have  the  same 
implications. Following the t-statistics, the significance of increase in correlations during 
the turmoil period (t) with respect to the stable(s) period is defined by:
2)(1
4)(
st
st
st
nnt
ρρ
ρρ
−−
−+
−=                      (3)
Where
)4,01.0( −+ st nn
t
with, nt (ns) indicating actual observed weeks during the turmoil (stable) period.
The following hypothesis is then put to test:
0: 21 =− ρρoH  versus 0: 211 >− ρρH
Where oH  is the null hypothesis of no contagion and 1H  is the alternative hypothesis for 
the presence of contagion
 
4. Empirical Analysis and Results
Empirical analysis and results are presented below on tables 1 and 2. 
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Table1: International stock indexes returns conditional (unadjusted) correlation coefficient s in 2007 financial crisis
Regions Countries Full period Stable period Short-term turmoil period Medium-term turmoil period Long-term turmoil period 
ρ σ ρ σ ρ σ t-test Co ρ σ t-test Co ρ σ t-test Co
Africa
Botswana -0.040 0.015 0.024 0.014 0.573 0.010 5.641*** Y 0.197 0.008 1.675* Y -0.188 0.013 -2.419** Y
Egypt 0.336 0.045 0.196 0.034 0.419 0.028 1.968* Y 0.212 0.028 0.154 N 0.353 0.051 1.757* Y
Kenya 0.083 0.034 0.008 0.028 0.049 0.030 0.494 N -0.178 0.038 -1.656 N 0.079 0.038 0.970 N
Mauritius 0.302 0.030 0.003 0.028 0.001 0.024 0.039 N -0.099 0.027 -0.922 N 0.382 0.031 4.636*** Y
Morocco 0.059 0.024 0.024 0.025 0.022 0.019 -0.014 N -0.109 0.019 -1.288 N 0.051 0.021 0.294 N
Namibia 0.376 0.037 0.417 0.024 0.558 0.034 1.219 N 0.111 0.043 -3.093*** Y 0.342 0.045 -0.845 N
Nigeria 0.027 0.038 0.095 0.032 -0.457 0.027 -5.710*** Y -0.410 0.026 -5.617*** Y -0.060 0.040 -1.743* Y
South A 0.435 0.030 0.380 0.021 0.674 0.024 2.641** Y 0.238 0.031 -1.378 N 0.428 0.036 0.522 N
Tunisia 0.258 0.016 0.129 0.014 0.183 0.009 0.462 N 0.165 0.018 0.343 N 0.341 0.018 2.405** Y
Middle 
East
A Dhabi -0.069 0.030 -0.053 0.021 0.246 0.024 2.706*** Y -0.133 0.025 -0.761 N -0.086 0.037 -0.356 N
Bahrain 0.017 0.015 -0.031 0.013 0.477 0.013 5.069*** Y 0.173 0.012 1.998** Y -0.004 0.017 0.297 N
Dubai -0.085 0.039 -0.027 0.027 -0.160 0.031 -1.146 N -0.173 0.030 -1.410 N -0.126 0.048 -1.089 N
Israel 0.264 0.028 0.531 0.023 0.697 0.019 1.444 N 0.287 0.025 -2.411** Y 0.089 0.032 -5.462*** Y
Jordan 0.015 0.031 0.044 0.020 0.148 0.016 0.893 N 0.034 0.020 -0.105 N 0.011 0.040 -0.381 N
Kuwait -0.085 0.026 n.a n.a 0.681 0.014 n.a 0.106 0.013 n.a -0.085 0.026 n.a
Lebanon 0.200 0.033 0.226 0.023 0.145 0.023 -0.710 N 0.181 0.021 -0.441 N 0.213 0.040 -0.155 N
Oman -0.217 0.031 0.112 0.016 0.013 0.019 -0.865 N -0.261 0.028 -3.867*** Y -0.306 0.040 -5.112*** Y
Qatar -0.133 0.040 -0.032 0.030 0.186 0.027 1.930* Y -0.101 0.037 -0.653 N -0.175 0.047 -1.595 N
Saudi A 0.012 0.047 0.059 0.041 -0.302 0.027 -3.339*** Y -0.113 0.053 -1.681* Y -0.002 0.052 0.522 N
Asia
China 0.073 0.056 0.071 0.048 0.528 0.045 4.507*** Y 0.071 0.048 0.064 N 0.063 0.012 -0.582 N
Dhaka 0.047 0.024 -0.275 0.020 -0.462 0.022 -6.698*** Y -0.275 0.020 -4.539*** Y -0.132 0.020 -3.289*** Y
India 0.264 0.038 0.252 0.044 0.400 0.042 0.574 N 0.252 0.044 -0.778 N 0.212 0.048 -1.355 N
Indonesia 0.057 0.040 0.394 0.054 0.773 0.055 5.268*** Y 0.394 0.054 1.389 N -0.031 0.052 -3.263*** Y
Malaysia 0.100 0.026 0.457 0.036 0.838 0.034 6.045*** Y 0.457 0.036 1.903* Y 0.015 0.031 -2.832*** Y
Mongolia 0.062 0.046 -0.093 0.044 -0.175 0.056 0.665 N -0.093 0.044 1.538 N 0.049 0.038 3.499*** Y
Pakistan 0.021 0.037 0.330 0.028 0.338 0.033 2.584** Y 0.330 0.028 2.798*** Y -0.031 0.042 -0.898 N
Philippines 0.361 0.040 0.621 0.045 0.855 0.053 7.127*** Y 0.621 0.045 4.229*** Y 0.373 0.048 1.749* Y
S. Korea 0.469 0.034 0.640 0.041 0.822 0.047 10.324*** Y 0.640 0.041 6.945*** Y 0.502 0.042 5.562*** Y
Sri Lanka 0.204 0.027 0.380 0.019 -0.100 0.021 -0.828 N 0.380 0.019 3.997*** Y 0.288 0.027 3.390*** Y
Taiwan 0.429 0.035 0.415 0.040 0.836 0.041 18.401*** Y 0.415 0.040 5.315*** Y 0.482 0.043 7.331*** Y
Thailand 0.355 0.037 0.422 0.039 0.715 0.035 5.908*** Y 0.422 0.039 2.722*** Y 0.385 0.046 2.698*** Y
Vietnam 0.204 0.060 0.319 0.056 0.524 0.032 3.842*** Y 0.319 0.056 1.985* Y 0.195 0.068 0.876 N
 
Latin
America
Argentina 0.543 0.041 0.644 0.026 0.752 0.045 0.934 N 0.630 0.037 -0.136 N 0.505 0.051 -1.556 N
Brazil 0.773 0.043 0.797 0.027 0.831 0.043 0.290 N 0.720 0.042 -0.744 N 0.765 0.052 -0.358 N
Chile 0.690 0.034 0.588 0.020 0.721 0.040 1.154 N 0.710 0.040 1.178 N 0.703 0.043 1.281 N
Columbia 0.475 0.032 0.336 0.026 0.381 0.030 0.386 N 0.616 0.034 2.802*** Y 0.504 0.036 1.896* Y
Costa Rica -0.020 0.028 -0.085 0.031 -0.088 0.019 -0.025 N -0.203 0.023 -1.140 N -0.083 0.021 0.023 N
Ecuador 0.030 0.029 0.085 0.015 0.010 0.005 -0.648 N 0.040 0.049 -0.431 N 0.016 0.037 -0.773 N
Mexico 0.774 0.037 0.721 0.026 0.814 0.037 0.800 N 0.865 0.037 1.391 N 0.784 0.044 0.692 N
Peru 0.422 0.052 -0.066 0.029 0.907 0.063 35.962*** Y 0.693 0.059 11.16*** Y 0.478 0.065 7.185*** Y
Venezuela 0.119 0.034 0.035 0.038 0.193 0.027 1.379 N 0.269 0.034 2.313** Y 0.159 0.030 1.385 N
The table shows the conditional (unadjusted) cross market correlation coefficients (ρ) and standard deviations for the US and other stock markets. Test statistics is obtained from t-transformations. The  
stable period is defined as the 14-month pre-crisis period (June 08, 2006 to August 09, 2007). The short-term turmoil period is defined as the four-month crisis period (August 09, 2007 to December 06,  
2007). The medium-term turmoil period is defined as the eight months crisis period (August 09, 2007 to April 10, 2008). The long-term turmoil period is defined the fifteen months crisis period (August  
09, 2007 to November 13, 2008). The full period is the stable period plus the long-term turmoil period (June 08, 2006 to November 13, 2008)   . Contagion (Co) occurs (Y)when the test statistics is  
greater than the critical values. No contagion (N) occurs when the test statistics is less than or equal to the critical value.*, **, ***: represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. (nt+ns-4)  
degrees of freedom for the t-statistics are (66+61-4); (35+61-4);(17+61-4) for the long, medium and short terms respectively. σ: represents the standard deviation. 
Table 2: International stock indexes returns unconditional (adjusted) correlation coefficient   in 2007 financial crisis
Regions Countries Full period Stable period Short-term turmoil period Medium-term turmoil period Long-term turmoil period 
ρ σ ρ*stp ρ*mtp ρ*ltp ρ* δ t-test Co ρ* δ t-test Co ρ* δ t-test Co
Africa
Botswana -0.040 0.015 0.030 0.034 0.026 0.647 -0.321 6.747*** Y 0.265 -0.466 2.278** Y -0.197 -0.090 -2.538** Y
Egypt 0.336 0.045 0.219 0.217 0.163 0.459 -0.202 2.133** Y 0.234 -0.189 0.168 N 0.296 0.475 1.498 N
Kenya 0.083 0.034 -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 0.048 0.062 0.479 N -0.155 0.339 -1.432 N 0.069 0.317 0.845 N
Mauritius 0.302 0.030 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 0.001 -0.163 0.043 N -0.102 -0.057 -0.949 N 0.373 0.060 4.502*** Y
Morocco 0.059 0.024 0.028 0.028 0.026 0.026 -0.250 -0.016 N -0.126 -0.250 -1.489 N 0.055 -0.160 0.320 N
Namibia 0.376 0.037 0.366 0.329 0.323 0.499 0.362 1.152 N 0.084 0.745 -2.419** Y 0.261 0.809 -0.694 N
Nigeria 0.027 0.038 0.105 0.106 0.086 -0.492 -0.171 -6.40*** Y -0.448 -0.195 -6.38*** Y -0.054 0.225 -1.573 N
South A 0.435 0.030 0.358 0.321 0.302 0.648 0.151 2.604** Y 0.198 0.471 -1.188 N 0.342 0.688 0.446 N
Tunisia 0.258 0.016 0.166 0.117 0.117 0.233 -0.399 0.582 N 0.150 0.221 0.312 N 0.311 0.228 2.198** Y
Middle
East
A Dhabi -0.069 0.030 -0.051 -0.050 -0.041 0.235 0.107 2.566** Y -0.124 0.145 -0.713 N -0.066 0.686 -0.275 N
Bahrain 0.017 0.015 -0.032 -0.033 -0.028 0.483 -0.033 5.160*** Y 0.181 -0.089 2.095** Y -0.004 0.235 0.268 N
Dubai -0.085 0.039 -0.027 -0.166 -0.021 -0.152 0.110 -1.089 N -0.166 0.094 -0.002 N -0.096 0.727 -0.830 N
Israel 0.264 0.028 0.569 0.522 0.477 0.731 -0.180 1.414 N 0.281 0.052 -2.380** Y 0.077 0.338 -4.829 Y
Jordan 0.015 0.031 0.050 0.045 0.032 0.166 -0.204 0.998 N 0.034 -0.017 -0.106 N 0.007 1.009 -0.269 N
Kuwait -0.085 0.026 n.a -0.007 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
Lebanon 0.200 0.033 0.233 0.239 0.178 0.148 -0.051 -0.727 N 0.191 -0.106 -0.463 N 0.167 0.653 -0.124 N
Oman -0.217 0.031 0.104 0.087 0.072 0.012 0.181 -0.796 N -0.204 0.680 -2.92*** Y -0.201 1.453 -3.149*** Y
Qatar -0.133 0.040 -0.035 -0.030 -0.026 0.198 -0.123 2.063** Y -0.092 0.196 -0.598 N -0.142 0.540 -1.289 N
Saudi A 0.012 0.047 0.074 0.052 0.053 -0.366 -0.351 -4.21*** Y -0.099 0.294 -1.474 N -0.002 0.267 -0.606 N
Asia
China 0.073 0.056 0.058 0.059 0.052 0.488 0.112 4.108*** Y 0.065 0.165 0.060 N 0.009 0.533 -0.470 N
Dhaka 0.047 0.024 0.178 0.173 0.171 -0.510 -0.121 -8.05*** Y -0.309 -0.224 -5.27*** Y -0.148 -0.210 -3.732 Y
India 0.264 0.038 0.223 0.266 0.256 0.272 0.559 0.426 N 0.200 0.637 -0.639 N 0.161 0.773 -1.067 N
Indonesia 0.057 0.040 0.107 0.165 0.169 0.490 1.441 3.566*** Y 0.267 1.392 0.983 N -0.021 1.287 -2.142** Y
Malaysia 0.100 0.026 0.152 0.195 0.208 0.679 0.780 5.338*** Y 0.352 0.872 1.521 N 0.012 0.632 2.222** Y
Mongolia 0.062 0.046 -0.203 -0.253 -0.270 -0.140 0.258 0.543 N -0.094 -0.009 1.544 N 0.053 -0.138 3.782*** Y
Pakistan 0.021 0.037 0.047 0.052 0.043 0.318 0.072 2.420** Y 0.342 -0.077 2.906*** Y -0.026 0.382 -0.764 N
Philippines 0.361 0.040 0.122 0.176 0.171 0.701 0.817 6.113*** Y 0.537 0.545 3.712*** Y 0.299 0.650 1.432 N
S. Korea 0.469 0.034 0.020 0.035 0.034 0.527 1.724 5.060*** Y 0.477 1.348 4.734*** Y 0.350 1.410 3.687*** Y
Sri Lanka 0.204 0.027 -0.006 -0.005 -0.004 -0.127 -0.216 -1.056 N 0.434 -0.271 4.687*** Y 0.286 0.017 3.362*** Y
Taiwan 0.429 0.035 -0.034 -0.050 -0.048 0.639 1.028 7.839*** Y 0.311 0.945 3.711*** Y 0.355 1.105 4.876*** Y
Thailand 0.355 0.037 0.109 0.121 0.111 0.605 0.374 4.908*** Y 0.353 0.527 2.282** Y 0.296 0.815 2.087** Y
Vietnam 0.204 0.060 0.172 0.109 0.098 0.687 -0.327 5.169*** Y 0.299 0.155 1.862* Y 0.165 0.416 0.744 N
Latin 
America
Argentina 0.543 0.041 0.538 0.579 0.410 0.654 0.746 1.006 N 0.565 0.407 -0.139 N 0.293 0.976 -1.312 N
Brazil 0.773 0.043 0.724 0.728 0.601 0.765 0.586 0.352 N 0.640 0.550 -0.843 N 0.557 0.900 -0.482 N
Chile 0.690 0.034 0.453 0.454 0.326 0.589 1.044 1.174 N 0.577 1.035 1.189 N 0.434 1.228 1.198 N
Columbia 0.475 0.032 0.316 0.300 0.252 0.359 0.142 0.370 N 0.567 0.289 2.665*** Y 0.394 0.377 1.591 N
Costa Rica -0.020 0.028 -0.108 -0.097 -0.123 -0.111 -0.376 -0.031 N -0.231 -0.235 -1.294 N -0.120 -0.309 0.033 N
Ecuador 0.030 0.029 0.145 0.047 0.034 0.017 -0.659 -1.106 N 0.022 2.360 -0.236 N 0.006 1.517 -0.308 N
Mexico 0.774 0.037 0.657 0.655 0.537 0.761 0.430 0.898 N 0.820 0.442 1.607 N 0.614 0.715 0.857 N
Peru 0.422 0.052 -0.045 -0.046 -0.029 0.824 1.184 15.092*** Y 0.555 1.072 7.210*** Y 0.242 1.268 3.117*** Y
Venezuela 0.119 0.034 0.042 0.037 0.044 0.229 -0.301 1.642 N 0.285 -0.114 2.452** Y 0.201 -0.216 1.760* Y
The table shows the unconditional (adjusted) cross market correlation coefficients (ρ) and standard deviations for the US and other stock markets. Test statistics is obtained from t-transformations. The  
stable period is defined as the 14-month pre-crisis period (June 08, 2006 to August 09, 2007). The short-term turmoil period is defined as the four-month crisis period (August 09, 2007 to December 06,  
2007). The medium-term turmoil period is defined as the eight months crisis period (August 09, 2007 to April 10, 2008). The long-term turmoil period is defined the fifteen months crisis period (August  
09, 2007 to November 13, 2008). The full period is the stable period plus the long-term turmoil period (June 08, 2006 to November 13, 2008)   . Contagion (Co) occurs (Y) when the test statistics is  
greater than the critical values. No contagion (N) occurs when the test statistics is less than or equal to the critical value.*, **, ***: represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. (nt+ns-4)  
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degrees of freedom for the t-statistics are (66+61-4); (35+61-4);(17+61-4) for the long, medium and short terms respectively. σ: represents  the standard deviation. ρ*stp, ρ*mtp, ρ*ltp denote adjusted  
correlation coefficients for the short, medium and long term periods respectively. δ: correlation coefficient adjuster. 
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5. Discussion of results
As shown on  tables  1  and  2,  contagion  results  based  on  significant  shifts  in 
conditional  (unadjusted)  correlation coefficients  are robust to  adjusted (unconditional) 
correlations. From a general point of view the following effects of the financial  crisis 
could be observed: (1) with the exception of India, Asian markets were worst hit; (2) but 
for Peru,  Venezuela and Columbia,  Latin  American countries  were least  affected;  (3) 
Africa  and  Middle  East  emerging  markets  were  averagely  contaminated  with  the 
exception of Kenya, Morocco, Dubai, Jordan and Lebanon. 
The  somewhat  immunity  of  Latin  American  countries  to  the  recent  global 
financial meltdown is not unexpected. Given its history of financial crises, this continent 
was the most prepared. Current conditions show that Latin America has improved since 
the Russian crisis, which gave countries in the continent some leeway (particularly in 
monetary policy) to implement measures that attenuate crisis effect. Latin America and 
the Caribbean countries have built up to 400 billion dollars in international reserves and 
they  have  substantially  reduced  their  dollar-denominated  debt,  especially  within  the 
banking system. For instance, lower levels of debt dollarization allowed Brazil to loosen 
monetary policy amid the credit crunch in ways that many countries could not in the post 
Russian crisis era. In the wake of the financial crisis, Latin American countries swiftly 
depreciated  their  currencies  without  entering  the  turmoil.   From a  fiscal  perspective, 
many  of  these  countries  saved  a  considerable  amount  of  their  tax  income  on  extra 
revenue from commodity bonanza at the turn of the century. For instance, Chile spent 
only 34% and kept the rest of increased tax collected in a special fund. Therefore even if 
the crisis had affected these countries, they still had the leeway of increasing spending 
while lowering taxes, so as to easily recover from recession.  
Results  from Africa are  entirely not  unexpected.  But  for Kenya  and Morocco 
Africa  stock markets  are  contaminated  in  at  least  one time horizon.  This  reflects  the 
increasing connection of African markets with global capital flows. As a matter of facts, 
African markets are growing in size, liquidity and degree of foreign participation. Though 
it may be misleading to equate contagion to integration; a logical extension of results 
could make a case for African equity markets global integration.
Looking  at  the  Middle  East,  with  the  exception  of  Abu  Dhabi,  oil  exporting 
countries (Bahrain, Israel, Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia) were contaminated while non 
producing states (Dubai, Jordan, Lebanon) remained unaffected. Borrowing from Anoruo 
and Mustafa (2007) on the relation between oil and stock prices, where causality runs 
from the Dow Jones Industrial Average(DJIA) to oil prices and not vice versa; the DJIA 
which is our base criterion in this study negatively affected oil prices  which in turn had a 
toll on stock markets of oil exporting countries. 
While India in Asia remained uncontaminated, China and Mongolia were affected 
only  in  the  short  and  long  horizons  respectively.  Other  emerging  markets  were 
contaminated at least in two time-horizons each. The unexpected speed and force with 
which the global financial crisis affected Asian economies could be explained from trade 
channels. The region has deep economic integration with the rest of the world, especially 
developments in the United States. A case in point is the loss in export volume growth in 
Western Asia from 6.4% in 2006 to -0.6 in 2007.  Conversely, the fact that India is not 
affected is not unexpected. This is because; India has a completely different approach to 
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financial  globalization.  Whereas,  the  Indian  current  account  was  fully  opened  on  a 
gradual basis in the 90s, a more calibrated approach has been followed to the opening of 
the capital account and subsequently the financial sector. This approach is consistent with 
the weight of available empirical evidence on the benefits of capital account liberalization 
for  acceleration  of  economic  growth,  particularly  in  emerging  economies.  Evidence 
suggests that the greatest gains are obtained from openness to foreign direct investment 
followed  by  portfolio  investment.  Benefits  resulting  from  external  debt  flows  are 
questionable until greater domestic financial market development has taken place (Henry, 
2007)
6. Conclusion 
Financial  integration among economies has the benefit  of improving allocative 
efficiency and diversifying risk. However the recent global financial crisis, considered as 
the worst since the Great Depression has re-ignited the fierce debate about the merits of 
financial globalization and its implications for growth especially in developing countries. 
This paper has examined whether equity markets in emerging countries were vulnerable 
to contagion during the recent global financial meltdown. Findings  show: (1) with the 
exception  of  India,  Asian  markets  were  worst  hit;  (2)  but  for  Peru,  Venezuela  and 
Columbia,  Latin  American  countries  were  least  affected;  (3)  Africa  and Middle  East 
emerging markets were averagely contaminated with the exception of Kenya, Morocco, 
Dubai, Jordan and Lebanon. 
Results  have two important  policy implications.  Firstly,  we confirm that  Latin 
America  was  most  prepared  to  brace  the  financial  crisis;  implying  their  fiscal  and 
monetary policies are desirous of examination and imitation. Secondly, we demonstrate 
18
that strategic opening of the current and capital accounts based on empirical evidence for 
a given region/country as practiced by India is a caution against global economic and 
financial shocks.   
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